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BOOK REVIEW 
IMPROVING FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION 
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY 
TIMES. By Benjamin Wittes, NEW YORK, N.Y.: ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD. 
2006. 168 pp. $14.95. 
Reviewed by Carl Tobias * 
Federal judicial selection is an essential, but highly controver-
sial, area of modern governance that is virtually impervious to 
constructive reform. Divisive accusations and recriminations be-
tween Democrats and Republicans, incessant conflicts, and non-
stop paybacks have troubled judicial appointments for decades. 1 
Both parties in the lllth Senate have already repeated those cor-
rosive dynamics, even as most senators are pledging cooperation.2 
Thus, astute students of the judiciary, the presidency, the Senate, 
constitutional law, and political science find alarming and intrac-
table the selection conundrum while they assiduously pursue effi-
cacious remedies. Benjamin Wittes's volume, Confirmation Wars: 
Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times, is a balanced, 
concerted effort to solve this dilemma.3 The monograph's timing 
* Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Paul 
Catanese and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions; Tammy Longest for processing this 
piece; and Russell Williams for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are 
mine. 
1. See, e.g., David S. Law & Sanford Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May Be 
Easier to Achieve Than an End to Partisan Confiict over Judicial Appointments, 39 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 923, 923-24 (2005). 
2. See, e.g., Letter from Senate Republicans to President Barack H. Obama (Mar. 2, 
2009), http://republican.senate.gov/publidindex.cfm?FuseAction=Blogs.view&Blog_id=3c5 
22434-76e5-448e-9ead-lec214b881ac (pledging to make the nomination process less "acri-
monious," yet threatening to withhold support of any nominee unless first consulted). 
3. BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN 
1173 
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was impeccable, as publication anticipated the shift in party con-
trol of the White House and the Senate.4 Rarely have the parties 
been so divided over critical issues, especially whether federal 
judges ought to resolve societal disputes regarding life and death 
questions, as well as the responsibilities that the President and 
Senate discharge when appointing judges. 5 
These. ·propositions make timely the scrutiny of Confirmation 
Wars, which this review undertakes. Part I descriptively analyzes 
the volume. Part II evaluates the many insights Wittes contri-
butes to readers' appreciation of contemporary federal judicial se-
lection. Part III details numerous recommendations. 
I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The Introduction wonders if judicial appointments might be 
different, a question that Chief Justice John Roberts posed rhe-
torically and speculated on affirmatively. 6 Wittes traces how the 
process of selection has grown increasingly partisan and crafts a 
few queries about confirmation. 7 He explores how appointments 
became "political battlegrounds,'' whether this change is for the 
worse or has improved the appointment process because it ap-
pears more democratic, whether the nastiness is only politics as 
usual, and why "Americans fight so tenaciously over" selection.8 
The writer concludes that modern political and academic dis-
ANGRY TIMES (2006). . 
4. In 2009, with this shift in power complete, Wittes published an updated version of 
Confirmation Wars, which included a new Foreword. See BENJAMIN WITTES, 
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES ix-xiii (up-
dated ed. 2009). 
5. Cf. United States Senate, Nominations, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/his 
tory/common/briefing/Nominations.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (discussing the Senate's 
tendency to "jealously guard[ ] its power to review and approve or reject presidential ap-
pointees to executive and judicial branch posts," as well as senators' routine consideration 
of "a nominee's philosophy or ideology" in their evaluation of a nominee's "ability and cha-
racter"). 
6. WITTES, supra note 3, at 1. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts opined: 
Can it be different? Of course it can be different. If there are serious ques-
tions about qualifications, senators should explore those. If there are serious 
questions about ethics, senators should explore those. If there are disputes 
about appropriate judicial philosophy and approach, talk about those. But 
barring that ... everybody doesn't have to think that this is an opportunity 
for them to be the reincarnation of Clarence Darrow. 
Id. (ellipsis in original). 
7. Id. at 5-7. 
8. Id. at 9-10. 
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course enunciates four responses.9 One school denies that funda-
mental change has occurred or has any grave consequences. 10 Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, the nomination system always 
has been, and remains, political, as politics is intrinsic to the 
judicial function.11 Another view, which is effectively orthodoxy 
for ideological conservatives, holds that liberals and Democrats 
have revamped appointments by seeking certain desirable policy 
results, not adjudication, from courts. 12 A third perspective, which 
the author characterizes as liberal dogma, ascribes selection's 
modification to Grand Old Party ("GOP") "right-wing court-
packing."13 A fourth theory laments the downward spiral and 
attributes responsibility to both Democrats and Republicans, 
viewing the change as one feature of civility's broader decline in 
"American political culture."14 
Wittes aspires to proffer more comprehensive reasons why the 
appointment process has changed, especially for the worse.15 He 
distinguishes Senate assessment of Supreme Court nominees 
from lower-court nominees, finding that the less public character 
of lower-court nominations has allowed the system to "[break] 
down more completely."16 However, each assessment nonetheless 
reflects the identical degenerative phenomenon: senators' fascina-
tion with controlling essential access to the judiciary.17 Unlike 
ideological observers who examine change vis-a-vis partisanship, 
the writer analyzes selection institutionally. 18 He conceptualizes 
the deterioration of judicial selection as a Senate response to 
growing judicial power following the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education. 19 Judicial authority expanded while 
confirmation politics became increasingly democratized over a 
longer term. 20 However, the escalating assertiveness of the Se-
nate's conception of its role has threatened judicial indepen-







16. Id. at 10-11. 
17. Id. at 11. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
20. WITIES, supra note 3, at 11. 
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dence.21 The author disagrees with Chief Justice Roberts's opti-
mistic appraisal that modifications could enhance selection.22 In-
stead, Wittes asserts, the nuanced question is how to manage the 
political conflict generated by appointments in ways that safe-
guard court independence and the executive's nomination prerog-
ative while maximizing the value to democracy of the rather ag-
gressive, ideologically charged Senate approval process. 23 
The second chapter, "An Unsatisfying Debate," thoroughly as-
sesses the leading explanations canvassed above for the contem-
porary selection process as well as their strengths and weak-
nesses, but ultimately finds all the proposed rationales 
insufficient.24 Chapter Three, "The Transformation of Judicial 
Confirmations," offers Wittes's explication of why the process has 
deteriorated. 25 Following Brown, the Senate broke with long-
standing tradition and began requiring nominees to testify before 
the Senate regarding their "view of specific cases" and their "judi-
cial philosophy."26 This change, according to Wittes, is one "from 
which the process has never quite recovered."21 The fourth chap-
ter, "The Threat to Independent Courts," evaluates selection's 
problems for an independent judiciary.28 Wittes ascertains that 
the potential downside to the current nomination process is that 
it inherently imprints "partisan identifications onto nominees 
whom we then expect to act as disinterested interpreters of the 
law."29 He admits the broader deleterious consequences of the 
modern process are currently speculative but still pose both im-
mediate and long-term concerns.30 These views prompt strategies 
to resolve the difficulties in Chapter Five, "A Confirmation 
Process for Angry Times": eliminating nominee testimony and 
premising Senate votes on nominees' records and others' testimo-
ny. 31 This idea would deter senators from extracting televised 
promises that involve future votes and would encourage members 
21. Id. at 12. 
22. See id. at 13. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. at 15-36. 
25. See id. at 37-85. 
26. Id. at 60-61. 
27. Id. at 60. 
28. See id. at 87-110. 
29. Id. at 89. 
30. See id. at 91. 
31. See id. at 119-29. 
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to apply pressure on the chief executive m advancing lawyers 
whom they favor. 32 
II. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Wittes affords a number of incisive observations. He descrip-
tively surveys four major reasons that contemporary academic 
and political commentators articulate for selection's troubled-
even dysfunctional-condition, illuminating why each is not satis-
factory before suggesting that his institutional approach provides 
a more accurate assessment.33 Much prior research has examined 
specific confirmation disputes, alterations in the process, and 
emerging trends;34 however, Wittes's book is among the finest new 
renditions. He meticulously documents relevant historical consid-
erations, assesses and imposes a salutary conceptual framework 
on essential phenomena, identifies applicable political and consti-
tutional linkages, and effectively analyzes how the whole can of-
ten be greater than the sum of its parts. Instructive are the detail 
and clarity the author brings to the four explanations. Wittes 
canvasses the schools' backgrounds, philosophical foundations, 
and present relevance as well as their advantages, detriments, 
and lack of comprehensiveness and persuasiveness. In the end, 
the writer advocates an institutional view, urging that it best ex-
plains changes over the last five decades as a Senate response to 
judicial power's ascendance.35 
Telling are his criticisms of this growth, which he indicates 
might eviscerate democracy and the rights and liberties that in-
dividuals now enjoy by undermining legislative branch authori-
ty.36 Wittes shows how the development may foster consolidation 
of power in the judiciary-authority that the elected branches 
formerly held-and constrict legislation designed to safeguard 
American freedoms. 37 Illustrative are judicial opinions that nar-
32. See id. at 128-30. 
33. See id. at 15-36. 
34. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM:, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON (1999); MICHAEL 
COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (2004); LEE 
EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENT (2005). 
35. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 3, at 59. 
36. See id. at 60. 
37. See id. 
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row congressional "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, "38 
the Constitution's. Fourteenth Amendment,39 which treat Su-
preme Court Justices, rather than lawmakers, as the judges of 
propriety. Equally troubling are the Justices' analogous limita-
tion of congressional authority to pass statutes under the Com-
merce Clause and the idea that they, not Congress, should be the 
arbiters of "effects" on commerce.40 This view is apparently a fic-
tion based on a misunderstanding of Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which undermines legislative power, espe-
cially the power to safeguard the public, and increases judges' 
authority.41 However, Wittes finds Senate treatment of enhanced 
court power an overreaction because it threatens judicial inde-
pendence. 42 
The author's central solution-ending nominee testimony and 
premising Senate ballots on candidate records and additional 
witnesses' testimony-might yield improvements. First, it would 
deny senators televised opportunities for self-promotion and for 
eliciting nominee pledges related to future votes. The concept 
may also help train the Senate's attention on the nomination 
stage and on importuning the chief executive to forward prospects 
whom legislators deem acceptable. A more specific illustration is 
consultation, whereby the president broaches potential nominees 
with lawmakers prior to nomination, a mechanism that has facili-
tated confirmation. 
The writer's clarification of the divisive rhetoric that infects 
discourse respecting judicial selection is also effective. For exam-
ple, the author finds woefully deficient the characterization of ap-
pointment battles as fights over liberal and conservative ideology, 
even while he blames partisan rancor for much difficulty. 43 The 
writer also clearly demonstrates the flaws in using notions, such 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
39. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that the patent laws that "abrogated the States' sovereign 
immunity from infringement" suits could not "be sustained as legislation enacted to en-
force the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"); City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its power when it 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). 
40. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS 
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 239-41 (2005). 
41. See id. at 240-41. 
42. See WITTES, supra note 3, at 12. 
43. See, e.g., id. ch. 3. 
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as "judicial activism," by maintaining that the practice of "activ-
ism" is frequently witnessed on both the spectrum's conservative 
and liberal ends.44 
His astute observations should correspondingly reach a broad 
audience. Despite the inherent complexity of the political, legal, 
theoretical, and policy-based questions addressed and the essen-
tially obscure character of the nomination and appointment re-
gimes investigated, Wittes's lucid, thorough explication and in-
formal-even colloquial-style will foster his monograph's wide 
distribution. Practitioners and law students will understand the 
volume, but readers without legal training should also find it ac-
cessible and informative. 
Wittes's cogent views have special force because his affiliation 
with The New Republic, the Washington Post, and the Brookings 
Institution might lead certain observers to assume that he would 
champion liberalism. Yet the author trenchantly disavows both 
this perspective and conservatism, as well as both Republicans 
and Democrats, basically for analogous reasons-each sacrifices 
pragmatism to ideological absolutism and deserves equal respon-
sibility for selection's dismal condition. The writer advocates 
moderation and depoliticization to better protect judicial inde-
pendence. 
III. SUGGESTIONS 
Notwithstanding the author's myriad insights, I can afford a 
few constructive thoughts. Adumbration of some notions would 
enhance comprehension of recent appointment disputes and the 
courts. For instance, it is helpful to appreciate that the existing 
process, which reflects how the Senate treats burgeoning court 
authority, may erode judicial independence. Equally valuable 
would be additional scrutiny of confirmation's effects on power 
distribution among the coordinate branches, given the inclina-
tions that all presidents and numerous judges have to claim more 
authority, namely vis-a-vis lawmakers. Specifying the horizontal 
ramifications should concomitantly elucidate modern debates, in-
cluding the preferable governmental branch and level, to address 
complex societal questions encompassing race, natural disasters, 
44. See id. at 25. 
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poverty, crime, and the multiple tensions between national secu-
rity and civil liberty. This material would assist policymakers and 
citizens in ascertaining whether the growth in the judiciary's 
power at the expense of the other branches helps the nation as a 
matter of structure and authority; if not, the material could help 
to discern ways for changing those trends. 
Another question is how responsive Wittes's prescriptions are 
to modern confirmation dilemmas. One example is his leading al-
ternative that nominee testimony be proscribed.45 Insofar as this 
measure would concentrate greater Senate attention on the nom-
ination process, that seems efficacious because mechanisms like 
consultation will likely improve appointments. His concept of 
eliminating hearings for uncontroversial nominees might facili-
tate approval because their review is perfunctory. However, disal-
lowing Supreme Court nominee testimony would forfeit an 
integral approach that can heighten legitimacy, and it would os-
tensibly undermine Americans' confidence that the confirmed 
Justices are qualified because senators would lack adequate data 
to cast fully informed votes. Preclusion of appellate nominee tes-
timony would correspondingly have minimal effect on the factors 
that have vexed this aspect of sele~tigp. These factors include en-
gaging in partisan gamesmanship; relying on contentious ideas, 
especially filibusters and "blue slips," whereby legislators from 
nominees' home states may withdraw their support; paybacks; 
and slowing designee analysis in hearings, in committee, and dur-
ing floor votes. Wittes's basic remedy thus may be somewhat in-
complete. 
These concerns do not undercut his astute contributions. Yet, it 
would be valuable to have additional views from an expert ob-
server who has meticulously scrutinized politics, the federal 
bench, confirmation, and separated powers. For instance, Wittes 
ought to have evaluated the ramifications of the Senate's increa-
singly partisan-and decreasingly collegial-nature for the ap-
pointment parameters that Confirmation Wars reviews. Wittes 
should also have examined how the unelected judiciary-the least 
democratic branch-is the greatest moderating force among the 
three, an irony which erodes the quintessential concern that ani-
mated the Senate's response. 
45. See id. at 119-31. 
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The author could have proffered and analyzed more concrete 
solutions to the difficulties-namely partisanship-that have 
troubled appointments. Many elected officials and scholars have 
formulated or applied a plethora of innovative concepts. Some fo-
cus on nominations. One effective avenue discussed briefly by 
Wittes is consultation, an idea that respects White House prerog-
atives and those of the Senate, such as early input.46 Moreover, 
this alternative fosters consensus on designees before nomination 
as well as minimizes surprises and embarrassing revelations. 
Another device is ''home state" lawmakers' bipartisan proposal of 
candidates, which a few jurisdictions used when Republican and 
Democratic legislators tendered alternating nominee sugges-
tions.47 The parties might concomitantly assess a bipartisan na-
tional judiciary, which would have each party submit candidates, 
thus reducing divisiveness. This approach may include a tho-
rough judgeships bill, which Congress has not adopted for two 
decades,48 and could even allow members of the party lacking 
White House control to suggest a few jurists. A related concept is 
the Senate's assertion of its prerogatives, which implicate appel-
late court nominations and their corresponding decentralization 
from the White House, and which has essentially assumed control 
over appellate selection.49 The President might concomitantly 
grant increased respect to longstanding Senate traditions, such 
as patronage; eschew divisive vehicles, such as recess appoint-
ments; or forward less ideological designees, all of which could 
help to galvanize consensus. These prospects, however, appear 
remote. 
Reform measures should also target the judicial confirmation 
process. For example, the proposed idea to eliminate hearings for 
uncontroversial nominees may be successful. President George W. 
Bush and others have urged imposing temporal limits on commit-
46. See id. at 115. 
47. See, e.g., Ranah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Quali-
fications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 754 (2008) (discussing practices 
of "senatorial courtesy"); Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary-Progress and the 
Road Ahead, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc. 155, 156 (1960) (discussing the President's in-
volvement in the nomination process with senators and senators' home states). 
48. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. The last comprehensive judgeships bill 
enacted by Congress is the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. 
49. See WI'ITES, supra note 3, at 38-41. "In both the Clinton and Bush administra-
tions, many nominees have had to be resubmitted to the Senate following non-action over 
the course of an entire Congress-sometimes more than once." Id. at 40. 
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tee analyses, floor debates, and committee and Senate votes.50 
The Bush administration even cabined American Bar Association 
("ABA") involvement in the process.51 However, a Federal Judicial 
Center evaluation was not sanguine about the initiatives' worth 
or about expediting confirmation, as the many participants and 
assessments suggest delay is critical.52 Yet techniques like consul-
tation will likely facilitate appointments, and certain elements of 
the confirmation process are amenable to streamlining. For in-
stance, President Barack Obama should steadily tender large 
numbers of well-qualified counsel because his administration has 
vigorously championed bipartisanship, a phenomenon witnessed 
in his appointments to the Cabinet.53 Public officials and scholars 
must fashion entities and institute approaches that rectify or 
temper the worst partisan excesses in specific contexts. One valu-
able-albeit controversial-notion was the "Gang of 14," an ad 
hoc bipartisan coalition of senators that formed in response to a 
Senate proposal to bar filibuster use with judicial candidates.54 
The entity preserved filibusters55-whose recommended termina-
tion would have jeopardized the Senate institutionally-while the 
group thwarted appointment of a few nominees deemed radical, 
even as others who seemed controversial won approval.56 The Se-
nate might abolish, or sharply confine application of, ideas found 
overly divisive. For example, it could eliminate "blue slips" or re-
quire that two legislators from nominees' jurisdictions object 
when discontinuing analysis. The Senate may correspondingly 
abrogate filibusters or reserve the notion for highly controversial 
designees. 
50. See, e.g., Remarks on the Judicial Confirmation Process, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1929 (Oct. 
30, 2002) (proposing that the Senate hold an up-or-down vote on nominees within 180 days 
of the submission of the nomination). 
51. Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Martha Barnett, Presi-
dent, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/print. php?pid=7856. 
52. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PLANNING FOR THE FuTURE: RESULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JUDGES 3, 25, 4 7, 69, 91 (1994). 
53. President Obama nominated three Republicans to his Cabinet: Robert Gates as 
Defense Secretary, Ray LaHood as Transportation Secretary, and Judd Gregg as Com-
merce Secretary. See Obama Nominates Gregg for Commerce Head, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 3, 
2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28974959/. However, Senator Gregg later declined the 
nomination over conflicts with the President's economic stimulus plan. Jeff Zeleny, Gregg 
Ends Bid for Commerce Job, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at Al. 
54. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Swing Senators Meet on the Court Vacancy, but Their Course 
Remains Uncharted, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at A15. 
55. Id. 
56. See Editorial, Judicial Review, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at A16. 
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Some measures apply to both nomination and confirmation. 
Merit selection panels, which aggressively identified and fostered 
the nomination of talented women and minorities, were effective 
in President Jimmy Carter's administration.57 Its emphasis on 
gender and racial diversity increased balance.58 The judges helped 
their colleagues appreciate complex questions that federal courts 
address, such as issues involving abortion, gender, and racial dis-
crimination, while limiting bias in the tribunals. Comparatively 
extreme theories also warrant attention. One unorthodox concept 
is altering judges' life tenure with, for instance, eighteen-year 
Supreme Court terms. This could defuse acrimony by lowering 
the stakes. 
It is critical to be realistic about instituting effective change. A 
few appointment problems-namely the substantial incentives to 
delay, manipulate, or subvert the current regime for partisan 
benefit and engage in payback-appear endemic or insolvable. 
Others derive from the Constitution, especially the President's 
nomination responsibility and Senate authority for confirma-
tion, 59 or might be venerated traditions or accepted norms, such 
as patronage and unanimous consent, whereby one senator de-
lays floor action. Thus, progress may remain elusive, so long as 
the party not occupying the White House sees an advantage in 
maximizing vacant judgeships in the hope that its candidate wins 
the next election and fills the open seats. Partisanship also can 
have affirmative dimensions, reflecting a healthy system of 
checks and balances and legitimate policy differences. Moreover, 
the actuality that the thirteen circuit courts are essentially the 
courts of last resort in ninety-nine percent of filings and the view 
that the appellate judiciary addresses controversial societal dis-
putes regarding issues, such as terrorism and homosexuality, 
make these nominations extremely divisive and apparently in-
tractable. 
Confirmation Wars might be profitably compared with recent 
efforts on judicial selection and the federal courts. They include 
The Next Justice by Professor Christopher Eisgruber,60 The Nine 
57. Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas B. Huron, Achieving a More Representative Federal 
Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483, 484 (1979). 
58. Id. 
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
60. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2005). 
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by Jeffrey Toobin,61 and Supreme Confl,ict by CBS Supreme Court 
Correspondent Jan Crawford Greenburg.62 The above propositions 
are important when exceptionally controversial, strongly held 
views about the best ways to choose judges, allocate governmen-
tal power and concomitantly retain horizontal structural in-
tegrity, and efficaciously protect judicial independence now fuel 
dialogue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Confirmation Wars significantly enhances appreciation of con-
temporary appointments, mainly by recounting how the growth 
in judicial power and its Senate treatment undercut judicial in-
dependence. The book affords numerous provocative ideas that 
President Obama and the lllth Senate ought to consider and 
adopt. Wittes elucidates certain phenomena, their adverse conse-
quences, and salutary relief in the form of a preferable approach, 
which would eliminate nominee testimony and potentially chan-
nel Senate attention to the nomination phase. This proposal 
might safeguard judicial independence by, for example, improving 
consultation. However, the device would have limited effect on 
appellate selection and could prove to be insufficiently compre-
hensive. 
61. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(2007). 
62. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007). 
